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Abstract
We examine financial challenges of purchasing items that are readily-available yet symbolic of loving
relationships. Using weddings and funerals as case studies, we find that people indirectly pay to avoid taboo
monetary trade-offs. When purchasing items symbolic of love, respondents chose higher price, higher quality
items over equally appealing lower price, lower quality items (Study 1), searched less for lower priced items
(Study 2) and were less willing to negotiate prices (Study 3). The effect was present for experienced
consumers (Study 1), affectively positive and negative events (Study 2), and more routine purchase events
(Study 3). Trade-off avoidance, however, was limited to monetary trade-offs associated with loved ones. When
either money or love was omitted from the decision context, people were more likely to engage in trade-off
reasoning. By abandoning cost-benefit reasoning in order to avoid painful monetary trade-offs, people spend
more money than if they engaged in trade-off based behaviors, such as seeking lower cost options or
requesting lower prices.
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The price of not putting a price on love
A. Peter McGraw∗ Derick F. Davis† Sydney E. Scott‡ Philip E. Tetlock§
Abstract
We examine financial challenges of purchasing items that are readily-available yet symbolic of loving relationships. Using
weddings and funerals as case studies, we find that people indirectly pay to avoid taboo monetary trade-offs. When purchasing
items symbolic of love, respondents chose higher price, higher quality items over equally appealing lower price, lower quality
items (Study 1), searched less for lower priced items (Study 2) and were less willing to negotiate prices (Study 3). The
effect was present for experienced consumers (Study 1), affectively positive and negative events (Study 2), and more routine
purchase events (Study 3). Trade-off avoidance, however, was limited to monetary trade-offs associated with loved ones.
When either money or love was omitted from the decision context, people were more likely to engage in trade-off reasoning.
By abandoning cost-benefit reasoning in order to avoid painful monetary trade-offs, people spend more money than if they
engaged in trade-off based behaviors, such as seeking lower cost options or requesting lower prices.
Keywords: sacred values, protected values, consumer welfare, taboo trade-offs
1 Introduction
“I would never sell my engagement ring or grandma’s clock
or. . . ” The sentiment is common; people balk at putting a
price on symbols of love. But applying the same prohibi-
tion to purchases could be costly. We explore the financial
consequences of failing to make cost-benefit trade-offs for
purchases associated with loved ones.
Our studies examine how trade-offs between love and
money in wedding and funeral contexts lead decision mak-
ers to abandon cost-benefit reasoning, focusing their deci-
sions on product quality over monetary savings. Moreover,
we show that a reluctance to put a price on symbols of love
extends to more common purchase events, such as bring-
ing dessert to a party. The inquiry highlights an important
consequence of decisions that demand pricing love: people
spend more than is otherwise necessary.
1.1 The case of weddings and funerals
Wedding- and funeral-related decisions occur frequently in
the marketplace – and are among the most costly in a con-
sumer’s life. An estimated 2.1 million weddings and 2.4
million funerals occur annually in the U.S. (Tejada-Vera &
Sutton, 2010). The average U.S. funeral costs $6,500 (and
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more than $10,000 with burial costs) and the average U.S.
wedding costs over $27,000 – totaling roughly $20 billion
and $42 billion spent yearly on funerals and weddings, re-
spectively (AARP, 2000; FTC.gov; Glaser, 2009; Rheault,
2007; The Wedding Report. 2010).
Wedding and funeral decisions are subject to numerous
social and cultural expectations (Bonsu & Belk, 2003; La-
derman, 2003; Mead, 2007; Ratner & Kahn, 2002; Richins,
1994). Consumers seem especially vulnerable to sales and
marketing tactics used by the wedding and death care in-
dustries (Boden, 2003; Fan & Zick, 2004; Kopp & Kemp,
2007a, 2007b; Mead, 2007; Mitford, 1998). Wedding
consumers, for instance, receive substantially higher price
quotes for products and services (e.g., cakes, photographers)
than for identically-described products and services for a
birthday (Browne, 2009). We highlight another challenge
of wedding- and funeral-related purchases (and acquisition
decisions for sacred purposes more generally): wedding and
funeral consumption contexts exemplify situations in which
people put a price on love.
1.2 Sacred items
The sacred is set apart and transcends the mundane partic-
ulars of life (Durkheim, 1925/1976). The Constitution is
more than a parchment with words, just as the Mona Lisa
is more than a painted canvas. Sacred items are not lim-
ited to the extraordinary; commonplace items, such as cars
or clothes, can also symbolize sacred values related to love,
youth, or autonomy (Acquaviva, 1979; Belk, Wallendorf &
Sherry, 1989).
Distinctive behavioral patterns emerge when people make
judgments and decisions about the sacred (see Bartels et al.,
40
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2015, Fiske & Tetlock, 1997). Decisions involving the sa-
cred elicit judgment errors, such as the omission bias (Ri-
tov & Baron, 1999), and greater negative emotions (Hansel-
mann & Tanner, 2008; Baron & Ritov, 2009). Sacred items
tend to elicit large and erratic selling prices (McGraw, Tet-
lock & Kristel, 2003) and less hedonic adaptation (Yang
& Galak, 2015). The central characteristic of sacred val-
ues is their exemption from trade-offs with the secular (e.g.,
money; Baron & Spranca, 1997). Trade-offs between the
sacred and the secular are treated by decision makers as
“taboo”. In economic terms, the marginal rate of substi-
tution of a sacred good for a secular good is infinite; no
amount of money can substitute for the Mona Lisa.
1.3 Responses to taboo trade-offs
Taboo trade-offs – such as putting a price on love – trig-
ger identity threats and distress, which people are moti-
vated to avoid (Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green & Lerner,
2000). People protect the sacred from trade-offs with the
secular (e.g., money) in a variety of situations (e.g. selling
heirlooms; money for hostages; end-of-life care; Baron &
Spranca, 1997; Tetlock, Peterson & Lerner, 1996; Tetlock,
2003). Forgoing cost-benefit reasoning prevents the sacred
from being reduced to the status of a commodity (e.g., “no
amount of money would make me sell X”; Baron & Spranca,
1997; McGraw & Tetlock, 2005). Blocking an exchange of
goods reduces negative emotions and protects against be-
ing “caught” undervaluing the sacred (McGraw, Tetlock &
Kristel, 2003; Tetlock et al., 2000).
Consumer research also identifies how people switch
from compensatory to non-compensatory decision strate-
gies when facing distressing (typically taboo) trade-offs
(Bettman, Luce & Payne, 1998). People will weigh costs
(e.g., car price) against attribute quality (e.g., styling) until
saving money could endanger lives (e.g., compromising on
safety equipment); then people focus primarily on quality
over price (Luce, Payne & Bettman, 1999, 2000). For in-
stance, people choosing between apartments will avoid cost-
benefit trade-offs by choosing to live in a safe neighborhood
with little concern for costs (Luce et al., 1999). Importantly,
Luce and colleagues find the effect holds when controlling
for attribute importance.
1.4 Inquiry
Money is a prototypical secular value, and monetary trade-
offs are particularly threatening when sacred values are in
play (Baron & Spranca, 1997; Tetlock, 2003). We inves-
tigate people’s reluctance to engage in monetary trade-offs
for products whose acquisition is symbolic of a sacred value:
love. Our studies find that a reluctance to put a price on love
causes people to spend more money than the consumption
context requires because — all things being equal — they
forego lower price options (Study 1), search less for lower
prices (Study 2), and avoid negotiating lower prices (Study
3).
2 Study 1A
Study 1 investigates how trade-off avoidance could lead to
overspending on engagement rings.
2.1 Method
Twenty-one undergraduates (47% female, Mage = 21, SD =
1.4) participated for course credit. Gender as an independent
variable or covariate yielded no differences (ps >.250).
Participants engaged in matching-choice tasks for an im-
portant wedding-related purchase (Luce, Bettman & Payne,
1997; Slovic, 1995; Tversky, Sattath & Slovic, 1988). The
study varied three attributes of the engagement rings: price,
carat weight, and color (on a 10-point scale from “Faintly
tinted, usually yellow” to “Colorless 1”, see Appendix for
example stimuli1). Larger carat weight and more colorless
diamonds are higher quality. We presented each participant
twelve pairs of rings by factorially varying low and high lev-
els of two attributes to create three trade-off types (price-
carat, price-color, carat-color; see Table 1). Pairs of rings
were presented in a fixed random order.
First, participants matched all pairs of engagement rings
by providing a value for a missing attribute to make the two
options equally appealing (Table 1). For example, option A
was .5 carat and cost $1,275; option B was 1.25 carat with a
missing price. The procedure accommodates idiosyncratic
differences across participants, thus making latter choices
comparable. Then, participants selected the ring they pre-
ferred in each of the twelve now-matched pairs (i.e., pairs
with the filled-in values). Finally, after selecting rings, par-
ticipants rated the importance (1 = very low, 7 = very high)
of the carat, color, and price attributes when choosing dia-
mond engagement rings (see Luce et al., 1999).
Although matching requires cost-benefit reasoning be-
tween high and low levels of an attribute, the choice task
allows for trade-off avoidance. If respondents willingly en-
gaged in price-quality trade-offs after matching, they should
choose either option with about equal frequency (Carmon &
Simonson, 1998). For trade-offs involving price (price-carat
or price-color) we expected participants to avoid trade-off
reasoning by choosing the high price, high quality option.
As a point of comparison, we examined decisions absent
price considerations (i.e., rings that differ only on quality;
color-carat).
1So that higher scores indicated higher quality, the color scale was
scored from 1 = “Faintly tinted, usually yellow” (the least colorless option)
to 10 = “Colorless 1” (the most colorless option).
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Table 1: Results from Study 1.
Price Color level Carat weight Choice
A B A B A B A B
1 Carat vs. price $1275 $2933 * * .5 1.25 5% 95%∗
2 Carat vs. price $1127 $3000 * * .5 1.25 14% 86%∗
3 Color vs. price $1275 $2750 4 8 * * 5% 95%∗
4 Color vs. price $1479 $3000 4 8 * * 14% 86%∗
5 Price vs. carat $1275 $3000 * * .5 1.28 10% 90%∗
6 Price vs. carat $1275 $3000 * * .58 1.25 10% 90%∗
7 Price vs. color $1275 $3000 4 8.52 * * 10% 90%∗
8 Price vs. color $1275 $3000 4.21 8 * * 21% 79%∗
9 Carat vs. color * * 4 8.75 1.25 .5 50% 50%
10 Carat vs. color * * 8 4.10 .5 1.25 62% 38%
11 Color vs. carat * * 8 4 .5 1.22 48% 52%
12 Color vs. carat * * 4 8 1.25 .63 84% 26%∗
Ave. Price vs. carat Low High * * Low High 10% 90%∗
Ave. Price vs. color Low High Low High * * 12% 88%∗
Ave. Color vs. carat * * High Low Low High 58% 42%
Note: Results from Study 1A matching-choice task displayed. For each pair of rings, the median
judgment for the missing attribute value (filled-in by participants) is italicized. The average percentage
choice for each pair of rings (with the now filled-in attribute values) is displayed. Higher values for
color and carat indicate a higher quality diamond. Aggregate choices by matching-choice task trade-off
type are displayed in the last three rows. When price is included in the matching-choice task, the choice
of option B represents the higher price option; when price is not included (i.e., color vs. carat), option
B represents the larger carat option. ∗ p < .05.
2.2 Results and discussion
We collapsed pairs of engagement rings into two categories:
price-quality trade-off (four price-carat, four price-color)
and quality-quality trade-off (four color-carat) pairs of en-
gagement rings. For price-quality trade-offs, on average
89% of participants chose the high cost option (χ2(1,241) =
56.89, p < .001). For quality-quality trade-offs, participants
did not choose differently from chance (58% chose color-
less diamonds, 42% chose large carat diamonds, χ2(1,79)
= 2.09, p = .148). Eleven of twelve trial level comparisons
conformed to our hypotheses (Table 1).
In order to control for differences in attribute importance,
we conducted a logistic regression with attribute ratings and
trade-off type (price-quality vs. quality-quality) as simul-
taneous predictors. The effect of trade-off type on choice
(Wald χ2(1,244) = 27.89, p < .001) remained significant,
controlling for carat importance ratings (Wald χ2(1,244) =
5.97, p = .015), price importance ratings (Wald χ2(1,244) =
3.92, p = .07) and color importance ratings (p = .250). These
results cannot be accounted for by the prominence hypoth-
esis — wherein the more important attribute looms larger
(serves as a tie-breaker) in the choice portion of a matching
vs. choice procedure (Tversky et al., 1988). This is because
participants indicate that price and carat are equally impor-
tant (5.62 vs. 5.24; respectively, p > .40) and color is less
important than both (4.14, ps < .05). The results suggest
trade-off avoidance causes people to select equally appeal-
ing, higher quality options in a wedding context – but only
when money is involved in the purchase decision.
3 Study 1B
We examine whether Study 1A’s effects replicate with an
experienced population of wedding show attendees (Alba &
Hutchinson, 1987; Bettman & Park, 1980).
3.1 Method
A researcher approached people as they entered a wedding
show. Twenty-two participants (86% female, Mage = 31, SD
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Table 2: Results of Study 1B.
Price Color level Carat weight Choice
A B A B A B A B
Price vs. carat $1275 $3000 * * .5 1.01 9% 91%∗
Color vs. carat * * 8 4 .5 .98 55% 45%
Note: Results from study 1B’s matching-choice task displayed. For both pair of rings, the median
judgment for the missing attribute value (filled-in by participants) is italicized. The average per-
centage choice for each pair of rings (with the now filled-in attribute values) is displayed. Higher
values for color indicate a higher quality diamond. ∗ p < .05.
= 9.1) agreed to participate. Eighty-two percent of partici-
pants indicated that either they, or their partner, had previ-
ously purchased a diamond engagement ring. Gender as an
independent variable or covariate yielded no differences in
forthcoming analyses (all ps >.200)
Participants completed a matching-choice task for one
pair of engagement rings. Half of participants were ran-
domly assigned to the price-quality trade-off condition,
where option A cost $1,275 and was .5 carats, and option
B cost $3,000 and carat size was missing. The other half
of participants were assigned to the quality-quality trade-off
condition, where option A was an eight on the color scale
and .5 carats, and option B was a four on the color scale and
carat size was missing. (Higher numbers on color scale in-
dicate higher quality; see Appendix). Participants matched
rings by providing the carat size that made the rings equally
appealing (Table 2). Then participants selected their pre-
ferred of the now-matched rings.
3.2 Results and discussion
Results were consistent with study 1A (see Table 2).
For price-carat trade-offs, the participants reliably selected
higher price diamonds (91% vs. 9%, binomial test p =
.012). For color-carat trade-offs, participants did not reli-
ably choose differently from chance (55% chose colorless
diamonds, 45% chose large carat diamonds, binomial test p
> .250). A logistic regression confirmed that price-quality
trade-off type increased probability of choosing the larger
carat ring (Wald χ2(1,20) = 4.21; p = .040).
4 Study 2
Study 2 investigates people’s search behavior when purchas-
ing items symbolic of love (see Ehrich & Irwin, 2005). We
expected a lower willingness to search for lower prices when
making sacred purchases.
4.1 Method
Ninety-five undergraduates participated for course credit.
We randomly assigned participants to conditions in a 2 (Pur-
chase type: sacred, funeral vs. secular, non-funeral) x 2
(Search variable: lower price vs. higher quality) between-
subjects design. Depending on purchase condition, par-
ticipants imagined they were purchasing a container either
for the cremation of a loved one (sacred purchase) or for
the storage of a grandfather clock (secular purchase). De-
pending on search variable condition, participants saw that
the container was high price or low quality. For the high
price container, participants saw an $80, higher quality (pine
wood reinforced fiberboard construction) container. For the
low quality container, participants saw a $49, lower quality
(triple-walled corrugated cardboard construction) container.
Depending on respective condition, participants indicated
their willingness to search for a lower price or higher quality
container (1= “Not at all”, 7 = “Extremely”) and the impor-
tance of the search variable (1 = “Not at all Important”, 7 =
“Extremely Important”).
4.2 Results and discussion
Participants were least willing to search when seeking lower
priced alternatives for a sacred purchase (see Figure 1). An
ANOVA on willingness to search revealed a main effect
where people were more willing to search for higher quality
than lower priced alternatives (F(1,91) = 6.54, p = .012), no
main effect of sacred versus secular purchase (F(1,91) = .45,
p > .250), and a significant purchase type by search variable
interaction (F(1,91) = 20.22, p < .001). To test whether par-
ticipants were least willing to seek out lower priced options
for a sacred purchase, we compared the sacred-price condi-
tion to the other three conditions (i.e., secular-price, sacred-
quality, secular-quality) in a planned contrast; in the sacred-
price condition, participants were less willing to search for
better (i.e., lower price) alternatives (F(1,91) = 13.69, p
<.001).
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Figure 1: Results from Study 2. Mean willingness to search
for lower price or for higher quality items depending on a
sacred (cremation container) or secular (clock storage con-
tainer) purchase context. Error bars represent 95% confi-
dence intervals of the means.
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In an ANOVA on importance of the search attribute,
search attributes were rated as more important when peo-
ple were searching for a secular purchase (F(1,91) = 6.98,
p = .010), importance of price and quality attributes did not
differ (F(1,91) = 1.54, p = .218), and there was a marginal
purchase type by search variable interaction (F(1,91) = 3.78,
p = .055). Next, we examined each attribute’s importance
depending on purchase type. When searching for a sacred
purchase, price was rated as less important (Msacred = 3.21,
SD = 1.23, Msecular = 4.71, SD = 1.55, t(46) = 3.66, p = .001).
The importance of quality did not differ between sacred and
secular purchases (Msacred = 4.25, SD = 1.70, Msecular = 4.48,
SD = 1.81, t(45) = .45, p >.25).
5 Study 3
Study 3 investigates people’s willingness to negotiate. We
expected people would be less willing to negotiate for lower
prices when making sacred purchases.
5.1 Method
One hundred and six undergraduates (51% female, Mage =
20, SD = 1.12) participated in exchange for course credit.
Gender as an independent variable or covariate yielded no
differences in forthcoming analyses.
Participants were randomly assigned to conditions in a 2
(Relationship type: sacred, loved one vs. secular, acquain-
tance) x 2 (Negotiated variable: price vs. quantity) design,
with the first factor within-subjects and the second factor
between-subjects. Presentation order of the within-subjects
condition was counterbalanced and had no main or interac-
tive effect.
Participants wrote about their feelings toward someone
“they care about deeply or love” [“they know, but not very
well”] who did [did not] occupy a big part of the partici-
pant’s emotional life (sacred and secular conditions, respec-
tively). Participants also wrote that person’s first name. The
name was subsequently inserted into the scenario and ques-
tions in order to make the materials more personally rele-
vant.
Participants imagined purchasing cupcakes for a birthday
party in honor of the person they wrote about, where cup-
cakes cost twenty dollars per dozen. Participants indicated
how likely they were to negotiate for a lower price [higher
quantity], how many dollars off [additional cupcakes] they
would ask for, and their comfort negotiating for a lower
price [higher quantity]. Finally, participants indicted how
much more they would be willing to pay to have the baker
write “Happy Birthday [person’s name]” on the cupcakes
on a seven-point scale (1 = not much at all, 7 = a lot) and
in an open-ended response. We expected people to be least
willing to negotiate for lower prices when the purchase was
associated with a loved one.
5.2 Results and discussion
We conducted a series of 2 (Relationship type: sacred,
secular) x 2 (Negotiated variable: price, quantity) mixed
ANOVAs on negotiation likelihood, initial negotiation of-
fers, and negotiation comfort (Table 3). We examined ini-
tial offers in two ways: in their original form (additional
dollars off or additional cupcakes asked for, depending on
experimental condition) and after converting all offers to a
dollar equivalent (by multiplying the number of cupcakes
by $20/12 cupcake, the price per cupcake specified in the
scenario).
Next, we assessed whether participants treated negotia-
tion for better prices for a sacred purchase differently from
other types of negotiations. In planned contrasts on each de-
pendent variable, we assessed whether the sacred-price con-
dition differed from the other three conditions (i.e., secular-
price, sacred-quality, and secular-quality). For two of the
three variables, planned contrasts were significant; when ne-
gotiating prices for sacred purchases, participants were rel-
atively unlikely to negotiate and made relatively modest ini-
tial offers (Table 3).
Finally, we examined participants’ willingness to pay for
cupcakes with a personalized birthday message. In planned
contrasts using both the seven-point willingness to pay scale
and the open-ended willingness to pay question, participants
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Table 3: Results of Study 3.
Dependent
Variable
Price
negotiation
Quantity
negotiation
Relationship
main effect
Negotiated
variable main
effect
Relationship
by negotiated
variable
interaction
Planned
contrast
Sacred Secular Sacred Secular
Negotiation
likelihood
2.46 3.12 3.87 3.19 F=.01,
p <.25
F=4.75,
p=.032
F=20.81,
p <.001
F=12.21,
p <.001
Initial offer
(dollars or cupcakes)
$4.53 $5.02 7.31 5.66 F=2.20,
p=.142
F=3.23,
p=.075
F=7.18,
p=.009
n/a
Initial offer
(dollar equivalent)
$4.53 $5.02 $12.19 $9.32 F=3.86,
p=.052
F=17.40, p
<.001
F=7.75,
p=.006
F=15.05,
p <.001
Negotiation
comfort
–.19 –.15 .24 –.39 F=8.56,
p=.004
F=.09,
p >.25
F=10.93,
p=.001
F=.14,
p >.25
Note: Mean values for dependent variables for each of the four cells (price vs. quantity negotiation by sacred vs.
secular) are displayed, along with results from 2 (Relationship type: sacred or secular) x 2 (Negotiated variable: price
vs. quantity) mixed ANOVAs and planned contrasts between negotiating on price for a sacred purchase versus the other
three conditions (i.e. negotiating on price for a secular purchase and negotiating on quantity for a sacred or for a secular
purchase). We display initial offer in two ways: in the original form, where half of participants asked for dollars off
and half asked for additional cupcakes, and in a dollar equivalent, where cupcake offers were multiplied by the price per
cupcake (i.e., $20/12 cupcakes). We do not conduct a planned contrast on the initial offers in the original form because
number of cupcakes and number of dollars are not directly comparable.
were willing to pay significantly more for customized con-
fections if the purchase was for a loved one (for seven-point
scale: Msacred = 4.42 vs. Msecular = 2.03, F(1,104) = 207.79,
p < .001; for open-ended: Msacred = $6.69 vs. Msecular =
$2.70; F(1,104) = 122.77, p < .001).
6 General discussion
People around the world purchase items of symbolic impor-
tance on a regular basis. Behavioral research offers estab-
lished theories of sacred values and trade-off avoidance to
help understand the challenges of the sacred purchasing pro-
cess. Our inquiry reveals that, when a purchase is symbolic
of love, people are reluctant to seek cost saving options and
thus spend more money than is necessary given the avail-
ability of lower cost (yet equivalent quality) items in the
marketplace. If consumers make many purchases of items
symbolic of love over a lifetime (e.g., for weddings, funer-
als, birthdays and anniversaries), then these monetary costs
could add up — especially for consumers who are already
having trouble making ends meet.
We explored three aspects of the purchase process:
choice, search, and negotiation. Respondents facing taboo
trade-offs not only chose higher price items over lower price
items they had judged to be equally desirable (Study 1), they
also avoided searching for lower priced items (Study 2), and
negotiating for lower prices (Study 3). The effects extended
to experienced consumers (Study 1B) and positive and neg-
ative occasions (Study 2). Trade-off avoidance, however,
ceased either when price was removed from consideration
(Study 1-3) or when the item was not associated with love
(Studies 2 and 3).
Loved ones want to demonstrate their commitment and
avoid painful trade-offs when purchasing symbolic items. It
is unclear whether the price-insensitivity we captured exper-
imentally — and its real world analog — would survive long
if people were fully aware of the psychological processes
that underlie their behavior. Loved ones might change their
behaviors if they realized third-party providers were pricing
symbolic items exploitatively (e.g., funeral homes; Mitford,
1998). Third-party providers, in turn, might alter their pric-
ing strategies if they realized loved ones were aware of their
tactics. In this light, how obvious are the influence patterns
to each party? How aware is each party of the influence pat-
terns at play at a given point in the evolution of the relation-
ships? We suspect the phenomena we have studied are in-
fluenced by a co-evolution of cultural norms and behavioral
strategies, in a world with two types of players: consumers
who have finite resources but want to believe some things
have infinite value and sellers who have financial tempta-
tions to exploit this dissonance inside consumers (Akerlof
& Shiller, 2015).
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Appendix: Example stimulus (Study 1)
Example stimuli for Study 1 are displayed below. So that
higher scores indicated higher quality, the color scale was
reverse scored such that values went from 1 = “M = Faintly
tinted, usually yellow” (the least colorless option) to 10 =
“D = Colorless 1” (the most colorless option).
The instructions read: “Please indicate the color of Op-
tion B that would make the two options equally appealing.
Assume the two rings are the same for any attributes that
are not mentioned:”
Option A Option B
Carat of diamond: 1.25 Carat of diamond: .5
Color of diamond “J” =
Nearly colorless 4
Color of diamond:
Select one
D = Colorless 1 D = Colorless 1
E = Colorless 2 E = Colorless 2
F = Colorless 3 F = Colorless 3
G = Nearly colorless 1 G = Nearly colorless 1
H = Nearly colorless 2 H = Nearly colorless 2
I = Nearly colorless 3 I = Nearly colorless 3
J = Nearly colorless 4 J = Nearly colorless 4
K = Faintly tinted, usually
yellow 1
K = Faintly tinted, usually
yellow 1
L = Faintly tinted, usually
yellow 2
L = Faintly tinted, usually
yellow 2
M = Faintly tinted, usually
yellow 3
M = Faintly tinted, usually
yellow 3
